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Research highlights 
1. This study investigates the development of bodily self-consciousness 
using the ‘full body illusion’. 
2. Self-identification with a virtual body is present at 6-7 years, and 
increases with age. 
3. Touch referral to a virtual body develops only by 10 years, while drift in 
perceived self-location is present only in adults. 
4. Therefore, links between multisensory integration and bodily self-
consciousness develop significantly across childhood. 
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Abstract 
The present work investigates the development of bodily self-consciousness and 
its relation to multisensory bodily information, by measuring for the first time 
the development of responses to the full body illusion in childhood. We tested 
three age groups of children: 6- to 7-year-olds (n=28); 8- to 9-year-olds (n=21); 
10- to 11-year-olds (n=19), and a group of adults (n=31). Each participant wore 
a head-mounted-display (HMD) which displayed a view from a video camera 
positioned 2 metres behind their own back. Thus, they could view a virtual body 
from behind. We manipulated visuo-tactile synchrony by showing the 
participants a view of their virtual back being stroked with a stick at the same 
time and same place as their real back (synchronous condition), or at different 
times and places (asynchronous condition). After each period of stroking, we 
measured three aspects of bodily self-consciousness: drift in perceived self-
location, self-identification with the virtual body, and touch referral to the virtual 
body. Results show that self-identification with the virtual body was significantly 
stronger in the synchronous condition than in the asynchronous condition even 
in the youngest group tested; however, the size of this effect increased with age. 
Touch referral to the virtual body was greater in the synchronous condition than 
in the asynchronous condition only for 10- to 11-year-olds and adults. Drift in 
perceived self-location was greater in the synchronous condition than in the 
asynchronous condition only for adults. Thus, the youngest age tested can self-
identify with a virtual body, but the links between multisensory signals and 
bodily self-consciousness develop significantly across childhood. This suggests a 
long period of development of the bodily self and exciting potential for the use of 
virtual reality technologies with children. 
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There is growing evidence that the brain basis of self-consciousness is 
underpinned by the integration of multisensory information about the body – for 
example, from vision and touch (Blanke, 2012; Blanke & Metzinger, 2009; 
Gallagher, 2005; Ehrsson, 2007). Modern scientific attempts to understand the 
self have thus focused on bodily self-consciousness - the non-conceptual and pre-
reflective representation of body-related sensory information (Legrand, 2006; 
Lenggenhager, Tadi, Metzinger, & Blanke, 2007) - and have decomposed it 
further to its component processes of self-location, first person perspective, and 
body ownership (Serino et al., 2013; Dobricki & de la Rosa, 2013). Self-location is 
the experience that the self is situated in a single, specific spatial location 
(Alsmith & Longo, 2014), while first-person perspective refers to one’s 
subjective experience being centred on one’s body (Vogeley & Fink, 2003). Body 
ownership is the feeling that one’s own physical body and its parts belong to ‘me’ 
– that it is ‘my’ body (Blanke, 2012). When body ownership is applied to the 
whole body (and not just to a body part) it is frequently termed self-
identification (since one identifies one’s self with one’s whole body, not with a 
body part; Blanke & Metzinger, 2009),  
Experiments using the well-studied rubber hand illusion (RHI; Botvinick 
& Cohen, 1998; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005) - showed that visual-tactile conflicts 
can create illusory shifts in perceived own-hand position, perceived touch 
location, and illusory ownership for a fake hand. An analogous ‘Full Body 
Illusion’ (FBI) can be created for the whole body, which uses visual-tactile 
stimulation to elicit changes in ownership of the whole body (‘self-
identification’), self-location, and perceived touch location (Ehrsson, 2007; 
Lenggenhager et al., 2007; Petkova & Ehrsson, 2008; van der hoort, Guterstam & 
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Ehrsson, 2011). It has been argued that the FBI is more likely than the RHI to 
lead to insights into the nature of the bodily self because the self is 
fundamentally associated with one's whole body, rather than single or multiple 
body parts (Blanke & Metzinger, 2009; Carruthers, 2008; Petkova, Bjornsdotter, 
Gentile, Jonsson, Li & Ehrsson, 2011). In the present study we examined, for the 
first time, the development of responses to the FBI in children (6-11 years old), 
with the aim of understanding how the multisensory basis of bodily self-
consciousness develops over childhood. 
A number of methods can be used to generate full body illusions; all make 
use of virtual reality or video-based virtual reality in order to present 
participants with illusory visual information about their body. Seeing a touch on 
a virtual body while synchronously feeling it on one’s own body evokes the 
illusory percept that one’s self is situated closer to where the touch is seen, i.e., 
nearer the location of the virtual body. It also induces a stronger feeling of 
ownership of (self-identification with) the virtual body, and illusory percepts of 
touch on the virtual body. Recent studies have shown that the FBI affects 
additional aspects of bodily processing, inducing, e.g., changes in tactile 
processing (Aspell, Lenggenhager, & Blanke, 2009; Aspell, Palluel, & Blanke, 
2012), pain perception (Hänsell, Lenggenhager, Känell, Curatolol, & Blanke, 
2011); Pamment & Aspell, in press) and body temperature (Salomon, Lim, 
Pfeiffer, Gassert, & Blanke, 2013). Neuroimaging studies of full body illusions 
have demonstrated associated changes in a network of brain areas. This includes 
premotor areas implementing body ownership (Petkova et al., 2011; Guterstam, 
Bjornsdotter, Gentile, & Ehrsson, 2015) and the temporoparietal junction 
implementing self-location (Ionta et al., 2011). 
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 The importance of multisensory information for own-body perception has 
recently been studied in children, and it has been shown that, from an early age, 
infants combine tactile and visual information arising from their own bodies. 
Newborns (Filippetti, Johnson, Lloyd-Fox, Dragovic & Farroni, 2013; Filippetti, 
Lloyd-Fox, Longo, Farroni & Johnson, 2014; Freier, Mason & Bremner, in press) 
and infants in the first year of life (Zmyj, Jank, Schütz-Bosbach & Daum, 2011) 
are sensitive to temporal correspondences between visual and tactile 
information on the face or legs.  Likewise, infants in the first year of life are able 
to detect temporal congruencies between visual and proprioceptive information 
(Bahrick & Watson, 1985; Schmuckler, 1996; Rochat, 1998). Work on the RHI 
(Cascio, Foss-Feig, Burnette, Heacock & Cosby, 2012; Cowie, Makin & Bremner, 
2013; Cowie, Sterling & Bremner, 2016) has shown that manipulation of visual-
tactile cues can also generate bodily illusions in children. Cowie et al. (2013, 
2016) showed that in 4- to 13-year-olds, synchronous visual-tactile stimulation 
on real and fake hands causes children to feel a greater sense of ownership for 
the fake hand than does asynchronous stroking, as well as a larger drift in 
perceived hand position towards the fake hand.  
 The current study examines responses to the full-body illusion in children 
of 6-11 years old, as well as in a comparison adult sample. This age range was 
chosen for several reasons. There is ample evidence that by 6 years children 
detect visual-tactile synchrony at least on upper (Cowie et al., 2013) and lower 
limbs (Zmyj et al., 2011). Therefore one would expect this source of information 
to contribute to bodily perception across the age range we tested. Pilot studies 
showed that a head mounted display was too heavy for use with children below 
6 years of age and moreover, it is at 6-11 years old that changes in sensory 
7 
 
processing emerge in the RHI. Specifically, across this age range the magnitude of 
RHI drift responses in both synchronous and asynchronous conditions declines 
(Cowie et al., 2013, 2016). Thus, from 6-11 years the influence of vision on 
perceived hand location (Makin, Holmes & Ehrsson, 2008) decreases in the RHI, 
and may undergo changes in the full body illusion also. This age could therefore 
be particularly relevant to our understanding of the development of the bodily 
self.  
To induce an FBI in the present study, we used methods first used in 
Lenggenhager (2007). This is a widely replicated paradigm (Aspell et al., 2009; 
Aspell et al. 2013; Ionta et al., 2011; Lenggenhager et al., 2009; Palluel, Aspell & 
Blanke, 2011; Salomon, Lim, Pfeiffer, Gassert & Blanke, 2013) in which 
participants, viewing their own body as seen from behind, receive visuo-tactile 
stimulation (stroking) on their real and virtual bodies. Thus, they see the virtual 
body while watching a stick stroking its back. During this time, synchronous 
(same time, same place) or asynchronous (different time, different place) strokes 
are delivered to the participant’s own back. In adults, synchronous stroking 
induces greater changes (compared with asynchronous stroking) in self-
identification with the virtual body and perceived touch location (feeling touch 
impinging on the virtual body), as indexed by self-report questionnaires. Further, 
self-location is displaced towards the virtual body. Self-location is measured with 
a walking measure following stimulation: with eyes closed participants are 
displaced backwards and asked to return to where they were standing during 
visuo-tactile stimulation. Following synchronous stroking, they typically walk to 
a point forward of their own previous position, towards the virtual body. This 
indicates a forwards drift in self-location. The FBI paradigm is used here to 
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investigate the development in childhood of the multisensory bases of bodily 
self-consciousness, including tactile perception, self-identification and self-
location. 
  
Method 
Participants 
We tested adults (M = 27.4 years of age, SD = 9.0, n=31), and three age groups of 
children (6- to 7-year-olds: M = 6.9 years, SD = 0.4, n = 28; 8- to 9-year-olds: M = 
9.0 years, SD = 0.2, n=21; 10- to 11-year-olds: M = 11.2 years, SD = 0.5, n = 19). 
For all participants, vision was normal or corrected-to-normal, and there were 
no histories of neurological or psychiatric conditions, or developmental 
disorders. All participants were naïve to the purpose of the study. Written 
informed consent was given by adult participants and by the children’s parents. 
Children gave verbal consent and were presented with a small reward (e.g. a 
sticker) at the end of the study. The study was approved by the local ethics 
research committee at Goldsmiths, University of London. The study was 
performed in accordance with the ethical standards laid down in the Declaration 
of Helsinki. 
Design 
To parallel Lenggenhager et al. (2007), a within-subjects design was used. Each 
participant received one synchronous and one asynchronous trial. The order of 
these conditions was randomised across participants. 
Equipment and procedure  
Each participant stood on a 1 x 4 m strip of carpet and completed: (i) a baseline 
trial, (ii) a recording of the asynchronous trial video, (iii) one synchronous and 
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one asynchronous test trial (order randomised), and (iv) a second baseline trial. 
After each test trial the participant completed a self-location drift measurement, 
and answered questionnaire items. An ipod and headphones were used to 
deliver white noise to the participant throughout. All age groups, including 
adults, were given the same instructions.  
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
In the first baseline trial, the participant standing on the carpet was told 
that they were standing on the spot of some buried treasure. They were asked to 
close their eyes and walk backwards while the experimenter guided them 1.5 m 
backwards from the starting position. While walking backwards, they were 
asked to make ‘small, penguin steps’ so that they could not use a strategy later in 
the task which relied on counting the number of steps taken. With eyes still 
closed, they were asked to return to the starting position using normal-sized 
steps. Drift was measured as the distance in centimetres between starting 
position and finishing position in the direction of the virtual body. Thus, positive 
drifts indicated anterior drift towards the virtual body. Following this, the 
experimenter moved the participant back to the starting point, using a figure-of-
eight walking path to disorient them and thus prevent any feedback from path 
integration which would allow participants to judge how accurate or not they 
had been with their estimate. Finally the participant opened their eyes. 
 Next we recorded the video to be used in the asynchronous test trial, 
while also training the participant to stand still whilst wearing the head mounted 
display (HMD, Video Eyewear, 80” screen at 1 m distance). The participant stood 
at the starting position, with a video camera positioned 2 m behind them. The 
video camera tripod stand was height-adjusted and where necessary the video 
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camera zoomed in slightly so that each participant was shown a region from the 
bottom of their back upwards to just above the top of their head (Fig 1). Thus, 
the same proportion of the body was visible to all participants. The zoom did 
also have the effect of making the virtual body appear slightly closer for smaller 
participants than for larger participants. Please see the Discussion section for 
further comment on these effects. 
The participant was asked to stay as still as possible and close their eyes, 
to ‘guard the treasure’. Additional black cloth covered the edges of the HMD so 
that none of the surrounding environment was visible. The participant's back 
was then stroked with a metre-long, blunt-tipped wooden stick, and they were 
told that the stick would ‘make them invisible to anybody trying to steal the 
treasure’. Strokes were delivered at a rate of roughly 1 Hz, on the back only, in all 
directions. Stroking was recorded for 2 minutes.  
 In the synchronous test trial, the participant was placed in the starting 
position wearing the HMD as before, but with eyes open. For two minutes the 
experimenter stroked the participant’s back while the participant watched a live 
feed of this on the HMD. This provided synchronous visual-tactile information 
between the real body and the virtual body visible 2 m ahead. Following this 
period, the participant completed a drift measurement with the same 
instructions as in the baseline condition (they took small steps backwards for 1.5 
m; they were asked to return to start point; and finally they were guided back to 
the starting point in a figure of eight motion). The asynchronous test trial was 
identical to the synchronous trial except that the participant watched the pre-
recorded tape of stroking rather than the live feed. Therefore, the pattern of 
touch felt on the back was different to that seen on the virtual body. 
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 As detailed above, the experimenter measured drift following baseline 
trial 1, synchronous test trial, asynchronous test trial, and baseline trial 2. After 
each test trial and subsequent drift measurement, the participant's HMD was 
removed, and they remained at the starting point facing forwards, to answer 
questions concerning their experience (adapted from those used in 
Lenggenhagger et al., 2007 and other FBI studies). The questions (see Table 1) 
addressed: 1. touch referral, 2. sense of ownership, 3. age related differences in 
affirmative responding (a control question), and 4. explicit awareness of 
differences between the synchronous and asynchronous conditions. Questions 1-
3 were asked in a random order after each test trial, and question 4 was asked 
only after the second test condition (synchronous or asynchronous depending on 
the assigned order of conditions). During Questions 1-2 the experimenter 
pointed in front of the participant to indicate the location of the virtual body. 
The answer scale we used has been successfully used with children in the 
rubber hand illusion (Cowie et al., 2013): “No, definitely not” / “No” / “No, not 
really” / “In between” / “Yes, a little” / “Yes, a lot” / “Yes, lots and lots”. For 
analysis, these responses were given equivalent scores from 0 (“No, definitely 
not”) to 6 (“Yes, lots and lots”).  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Statistical analyses  
The measures taken were therefore drift in self-location; and the results of 
questionnaire items 1-4 for assessing self-identification with, and touch referral 
to, the virtual body.  
To assess effects of Synchrony and Age on drift data we used standard 
parametric statistics (ANOVA and t-tests). We note that questionnaire items give 
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ordinal data, and therefore present medians and interquartile ranges for these 
rather than means and standard deviations. Further, for our main analyses of the 
questionnaire data, prior to submitting the data to parametric testing, we first 
applied an Aligned Rank Transformation (Wobbrock, Findlater, Gergle, Higgins, 
2011). This procedure produces ranks of nonparametric data (Conover & Iman, 
1981), while also including an alignment step which, importantly for the present 
study, allows for the correct assessment of interaction effects. This aligned 
ranked data was then submitted to standard mixed ANOVA to enable us to 
examine effects of Age and Synchrony. Follow-up comparisons were conducted 
using the appropriate non-parametric tests on the untransformed questionnaire 
data (e.g. Kruskal-Wallis H tests; Wilcoxon tests). On the basis of previous 
literature, we have a strong a priori expectation that questionnaire items and 
drift measures will be higher in the synchronous than in the asynchronous 
stroking mode (Tsakiris, 2010). Therefore, paired comparisons between 
synchronous and asynchronous conditions were one-tailed. Reported p-values 
reflect this, as well as Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons (described 
throughout); α remains at .05. 
 
Results 
While all questionnaire results presented are for the transformed data, we also 
note that all main effects and interactions reported below were present also in 
ANOVA of the untransformed data. 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
Q3 (control question) and data correction for response bias 
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We will first present the results of Q3, a control question (“When I was stroking 
with the magic wand, did it feel like your nose was growing?”). Fig 2a shows that 
children and adults responded somewhat differently to this question. ANOVA 
confirmed that while there was no significant effect of Synchrony, F(1,95)=0.02, 
p=.89, 2p < 0.001, and no interaction between Synchrony and Age, F(3,95)=1.2, 
p=.31, 2p = 0.04, there was a significant effect of Age, F(3,95)=8.7, p<.001, 
2
p = 
0.22. This included significant linear (p=.001) and quadratic (p=.001) 
components. Children tended to agree with statements more positively than 
adults: median ratings were 6-to 7-year-olds (Mdn=1), 8- to 9-year-olds 
(Mdn=1.75), 10-to 11-year-olds (Mdn=1), and adults (Mdn=0). While these age-
related differences in response style would not affect the crucial synchronous vs. 
asynchronous comparisons, they could contribute to effects of age. 
Therefore, on the assumption that children’s tendency to agree likely 
affected responses to other questions, we compensated for this in subsequent 
analyses by calculating for each child scores for Q1, Q2 and Q4 which have been 
corrected for response bias. To do this, we subtracted for each child their 
average score on Q3 from their score for Q1, Q2, and Q4. This was initially done 
for all participants. However, while for most participants ratings on Q3 (control) 
were low (0-2), for some participants the responses to Q3 (control) were 
actually higher than responses to one or more of the other questions. This would 
have made corrected values negative. We suspect that this is because Q3 asked 
about the nose, and some participants reported that they were very aware of the 
HMD weighing down on their nose. In these cases we think that Q3 responses 
reflected a genuine attempt to indicate some feeling about one’s nose, rather 
than a propensity to use the answer scale in a particular way. However, to be 
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cautious, we removed participants for whom Q3 responses were higher than Q1, 
Q2 or Q4 responses (6-7 year olds n=6; 8-9 year olds n=9; 10-11 year olds n=6). 
The remaining sample was as follows: 6- to 7-year-olds (n=22); 8- to 9-
year-olds (n=12); 10- to 11-year-olds (n=13); adults (n=31). The low sample 
sizes in the middle two age groups resulted in a significant loss of statistical 
power compared with the younger (6-7 years) and older (adult) groups. The 
following analyses therefore combine the 8- to 9-year-old and 10- to 11-year-old 
groups, giving a sample as follows: 6- to 7-year-olds (M=6.9y, SD=0.4y, n=22); 8- 
to 11-year-olds (M=10.2y, SD=1.2y, n=25); adults (M=27.4y, SD=9.0y, n=31). 
The correction for response bias affected results only slightly: all ANOVA 
results remained the same as for the raw data (see footnotes, and Fig S1). 
Nevertheless it provides a more valid measure of children’s experience of the 
FBI. These data are shown in Figs 2b-d, and presented in our main analyses 
below.  
Q1 (Touch Referral) 
ANOVA on Q1 scores (Fig 2b) showed a main effect of Age, F(2,75)=4.3, p=.016, 
2p = 0.10, a main effect of Synchrony, F(1,75)=78.9, p<.001, 
2
p = 0.51; and a 
significant interaction, F(2,75)=6.3, p=.003, 2p = 0.14.1 Synchronous stroking 
(Mdn=5) produced stronger feelings of referred touch than asynchronous 
stroking (Mdn=3). Age showed a significant quadratic contrast (p=.025): 
averaged across stroking conditions, 8- to 11-year-olds had a lower median 
rating (Mdn=3.25) than 6-to 7-year-olds (Mdn=4) or adults (Mdn=4.75). 
                                                        
1 ANOVA of the full sample’s raw scores, in their original four age groups (Fig S1), shows a main 
effect of Age, F(3,95)=4.3, p=.007, 2p = 0.12; a main effect of Synchrony, F(1,95)=73.2, p<.001, 
2
p 
= 0.44; and a significant Age x Synchrony interaction, F(3,95)=16.2, p<.001, 2p = 0.34. 
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To explore the Age by Synchrony interaction, we first measured the 
effects of Synchrony at each age with Wilcoxon-Signed Rank tests (one-tailed, 
corrected for three multiple comparisons). Synchronous stroking produced 
stronger feelings of referred touch than asynchronous stroking for adults (Z=-
4.7, p<.001, r = .84), and at 8-11 years (Z=-2.9, p=.006, r = -.58), but not at 6-7 
years (Z=-1.7, p=.135, r = -.36). Thus, the effects of Synchrony on illusory touch 
referral to the virtual body increase with age, becoming fully apparent at 8-11 
years of age. 
To explore the Age by Synchrony interaction further, we measured the 
effects of age in each stroking condition with a Kruskal-Wallis H test, followed up 
with Dunn’s (1964) post-hoc tests corrected using the Bonferroni method. The 
synchronous condition showed a significant effect of Age, χ2(2)=18.9, p<.001, 
with scores for adults higher than both 6- to 7-year-olds (p=.001) and 8- to 11-
year-olds (p=.001) but no difference between the two child groups (p=1.0). In 
the asynchronous condition, there was no effect of Age, χ2(2)=0.2, p=.197. Thus, 
the development of touch referral with age emerged largely from age-related 
strengthening of responses to the synchronous condition, rather than weakening 
of responses to the asynchronous condition.  
Q2 (self-identification) 
ANOVA on Q2 scores (Fig. 2c) showed a main effect of Age, F(2,75)=4.5, 
p=.014,2p = 0.11; a main effect of Synchrony, F(1,75)=91.3, p<.001, 
2
p = 0.55; 
and a significant interaction, F(2,75)=9.1, p<.001, 2p = 0.20.2 Synchronous 
stroking (Mdn=5) produced stronger agreement than asynchronous stroking 
                                                        
2 ANOVA on the full sample’s raw scores (Fig. S1), in four age groups, showed a main effect of 
Age, F(3,95)=7.1, p<.001, 2p =0.183; a main effect of Synchrony, F(1,95)=105.6, p<.001, 
2
p 
=0.53; and a significant interaction, F(3,95)=14.2, p<.001, 2p =0.31. 
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(Mdn=3). There was a significant quadratic effect of age (p=.005) such that that 
6- to 7-year-olds (Mdn=4.5) and adults (Mdn=4.75) scored most highly, with 8- 
to 11-year-olds (Mdn=3.5) scoring more moderately.  
To explore the Age by Synchrony interaction, we first measured the 
effects of synchrony at each age with paired samples t-tests (one-tailed, 
corrected for three multiple comparisons). These showed that synchronous 
stroking produced stronger agreement than asynchronous at 6-7 years (Z=-2.2, 
p=.042, r = -.47); 8-11 years, (Z=-3.3, p=.002, r = -.66); and adult, (Z=-4.3, p<.001, 
r = -.77).  
Using analyses to explore the Age by Synchrony interaction further (as 
per Q1), we tested the effects of age in each stroking condition. There was an 
effect of Age in the synchronous condition, χ2(2)=11.9, p=.003. Bonferroni-
corrected post-hoc Dunn’s tests showed no difference between the two child 
groups (p=.63) or between 6- to 7-year-olds and adults (p=.15), but adults 
scored significantly higher than 8- to 11-year-olds (p=.002). There was also a 
significant effect of Age in the asynchronous condition, χ2(2)=9.6, p=.008. Here, 
scores were highest in the youngest group, with a significant reduction at 8- to 
11-years (p=.016) and adult (p=.023). There was no difference between the two 
older groups (p=1.0). Thus, feelings of self-identification in the synchronous 
condition broadly increased with age while in the asynchronous condition they 
declined. 
Q4 (awareness) 
To ask whether participants were aware of a difference between the 
synchronous and asynchronous conditions, we used a Kruskal-Wallis H test to 
examine the effect of Age on responses to question 4 (Fig 2d). This analysis 
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showed a main effect of Age, χ2(2)=14.9, p=.001.3 Post-hoc Bonferroni-corrected 
Dunn’s tests showed a significant difference between 6- to 7-year-olds and adults 
(p=.000) but not between the two child groups (p=.27) or between 8- to 11-year-
olds and adults (p=.10). Thus, the extent to which participants noticed the 
difference between stroking conditions broadly increased with age. 
Drift measures 
Since we did not need to exclude any participants as for the questionnaire data, 
these analyses are presented for the full sample of participants in four age 
groups. Self-location was measured by the ‘drift’ from the participant’s actual 
starting position to the perceived own-body location following visuo-tactile 
stimulation, with positive values indicating anterior drift (towards the virtual 
body). To estimate the perceived own-body location, participants were displaced 
backwards and asked to return to their starting point.  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
We first took two baseline trials of the walking estimate, with no visuo-
tactile stimulation. An accurate response would be when the participant walked 
back exactly to their starting point. For each trial, we calculated the distance 
between this point (‘zero’) and the actual point that the participant walked to. 
Positive errors indicated that the participant walked too far forwards; negative 
errors indicated that they did not walk far enough. The constant error for each 
participant was calculated by taking the mean of these two trials. Baseline 
constant error (Table 2) showed a main effect of Age, F(3,95)=3.4, p=.021, 2 = 
0.10. Neither linear nor quadratic trends were significant. Baseline variable error 
                                                        
3 Analysis of the full sample’s uncorrected scores (Fig S1), in four age groups, showed a main 
effect of Age, χ2(3)= 18.0, p<.001. 
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was calculated by taking the unsigned difference between the two walking 
estimates (given the low number of points, standard deviation was an 
inappropriate measure). Baseline variable error (Table 2) showed a main effect 
of Age, F(3,95)=3.9, p=.011, 2 = 0.11, with a strong linear component (p=.001). 
Importantly therefore, these baseline estimates were subtracted from post-
stimulation estimates to give a measure of drift following stroking that is 
corrected for any baseline age differences in the distance estimation task. 
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
This baseline-corrected drift (Fig. 3) showed a main effect of Age, 
F(3,95)=3.3, p=.025, 2p = 0.09, and an interaction between Synchrony and Age, 
F(3,95)=5.5, p=.002, 2p = 0.15, but no effect of Synchrony, F(1,95)=0.002, 
p=.961, 2p < 0.001. The effect of Age had a significant linear component 
(p=.008), with average drift increasing across age groups (6-7 years M=-0.1; 8-9 
years M=0.04; 10-11 years M=0.05; Adult M=0.07). One-tailed paired samples t-
tests, corrected for four multiple comparisons, showed that synchronous 
stroking produced larger drift than asynchronous stroking for adults, t(30)=4.8, 
p<.001, d = 0.9, but not for 6- to 7-year-olds, t(27)=-0.8, p=0.79, d = -0.2, 8- to 9-
year-olds, t(20)=1.0, p=0.16, d = 0.2, or 10- to 11-year-olds, t(18)=-2.3, p=0.98, d 
= -0.5. One-sample t-tests comparing drift with zero showed a difference only for 
adults in the synchronous condition (Table 3).  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
Discussion 
The present study investigated whether we could experimentally induce a 
‘full body illusion’ in children, as found in adult participants (e.g., Lenggenhager 
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et al., 2007). We found that synchronous visuo-tactile stimulation of the 
participant’s body and the virtual body produced self-identification with the 
virtual body in both children (6-7 and 10-11 years of age) and adults; and a 
perceived referral of touch to the virtual body in 10- to 11-year-olds and adults. 
Synchronous stimulation also produced an anterior drift in perceived self-
location (towards the virtual body) in adults, although not in children of any age. 
Thus, for children as for adults, visuo-tactile synchrony modulated self-
identification, and we note that self-identification with the virtual body can be 
induced at the earliest ages tested (6-7 years). However, the full complement of 
adult-like responses to the full body illusion appears to take some years to 
develop, with substantial developmental change across childhood in the extent 
to which visuo-tactile synchrony modulates self-identification, touch referral, 
and self-location. This work substantially advances our knowledge of how bodily 
self-consciousness develops, moving beyond what is known both of multisensory 
perception (Filippetti et al., 2013, 2014; Freier et al., in press; Bahrick & Watson, 
1985; Rigato et al., 2014; Rochat, 1998; Zmyj et al., 2011) and a sense of 
ownership relating to body parts (Cowie et al., 2013, 2016). It shows significant 
development across childhood in the sensory bases of whole body ownership, 
which is arguably more fundamentally tied to the sense of self (Blanke & 
Metzinger, 2009). 
 
Self-identification 
At 6-7 years, 10-11 years and in adults, synchronous visuo-tactile 
stimulation elicited greater self-identification with the virtual body than did 
asynchronous stimulation. Questionnaire ratings in the synchronous condition 
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were higher than scores in asynchronous condition. These results demonstrate 
for the first time that visuo-tactile synchrony contributes to identification of the 
whole body in children as young as 6-7 years. 
The current study accords well with the findings of adult studies using the 
same FBI paradigm (e.g., Aspell et al., 2009, 2012; Lenggenhager, Mouthon & 
Blanke, 2009; Lenggenhager et al., 2007). In our set-up, participants viewed the 
body from a third person perspective – that is, as if seen by someone else, and 
not from a first person perspective, in the visual reference frame of one’s own 
body. The third person perspective version of the FBI produces a weaker illusion 
than a first person perspective version (Petkova, Kohshnevis & Ehrsson, 2011; 
Maselli & Slater, 2013; Pomés & Slater, 2013), and some authors have claimed 
that self-identification ratings in third person perspective set-ups merely 
demonstrate self-recognition as one would recognize oneself in a mirror 
(Petkova et al., 2011). However, this does not explain why in our dataset and 
those of others (e.g., Aspell et al., 2009; Lenggenhager, 2007) synchronous 
stroking produces stronger self-identification than asynchronous stroking. We 
therefore suggest that the current results show a genuine manipulation of self-
identification with the virtual body in young children as well as in adults. This 
illusion of viewing one’s body in extrapersonal space is a striking demonstration 
of the power of multisensory cues in own-body perception, and accords with 
naturally-occurring (if rare) neurological disorders, known as autoscopic 
phenomena (out of body experiences, heautoscopy and autoscopic 
hallucinations) in which one’s illusory double is seen from a third person 
perspective (Heydrich & Blanke, 2013). Indeed, in one published case of 
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heautoscopy a patient has reported seeing her double from behind (Blanke et al., 
2004). 
Here we show both a significant contribution of multisensory information 
to self-identification with a virtual body at 6 years, and a significant increase in 
the extent to which visuo-tactile synchrony modulates self-identification from 6 
years to adulthood. Interestingly, the youngest children did not explicitly notice a 
difference between stroking conditions. Our strict correction for response bias 
also means that the findings were not an artifact of young children’s propensity 
to agree with the experimenter. We also note that this occurred despite the fact 
that increased zoom for smaller participants may have given them an illusion of 
a slightly closer body. This kind of self-identification is apparent and modulated 
by visuo-tactile synchrony at the youngest age we tested in the current 
paradigm.  
The current view of developing bodily self-consciousness is that an 
implicit awareness of the body, a kind of postural schema directed towards 
action control, is present in the 3-month-old infant, who is able to identify for 
example whether limbs in a display move contingently with her own (Rochat & 
Morgan 1995, Bahrick & Watson 1985; Rochat, 2010; although see Bremner, 
2016). Two years of age marks a transition from this online, action-driven bodily 
awareness to a more conceptual understanding of the self. Thus, by this age, 
most children pass the ‘rouge’ test, checking for a mark on their own body when 
they see one on the body in the mirror (Lewis & Brooks_Gunn, 1979; Povinelli, 
1995). They also demonstrate increasing understanding that the self is both 
distinct from, and observed by, other selves - for example by showing 
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embarrassment at a mirror image (Rochat, 2009), or using personal pronouns 
like ‘mine’ (Lewis & Ramsay, 2004) . 
This view rather overlooks the possibility of significant sensory 
developments occurring beyond infancy. However, there is good reason to 
believe that these do occur. Both we (Bremner, Hill, Pratt, Rigato & Spence, 2013; 
Cowie, Sterling & Bremner, 2016) and others (Contreras-Vidal, Bo, Boudreau, & 
Clark, 2005; Nardini, Begus & Mareschal, 2012) have shown that the relations 
between sensory information and body-part localisation develop right through 
childhood. The present study provides a striking demonstration of protracted 
development in the sensory foundations of the bodily self: As age increased, so 
too did the link between visuo-tactile synchrony and self-identification with the 
body. Further, the current data suggest additional work at this age is merited, 
both to unpick development within the 8-11-year age bracket and to understand 
how the non-linearities we find in body identification during mid-childhood (e.g., 
lower response to the synchronous condition at 8-11 years, Fig 2c) parallel what 
it known of hand localization. What is manipulated in the Full Body Illusion is the 
experience of owning a single, whole body situated in space and providing a 
standpoint for perception and action (‘minimal phenomenal selfhood’, Blanke & 
Metzinger, 2009). The current data emphasize that not only does a cognitive, 
reflective sense of self develop in childhood, but so too do these lower-level 
sensory foundations of self-consciousness.  
This is in contrast to the much earlier-developing ownership of a fake 
hand using similar techniques: in the RHI paradigm there is no change in the 
effect of synchrony on ownership between 4 years and adulthood (Cowie et al., 
2013). One explanation of this discrepancy is that full-body representations take 
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longer to develop to maturity than do body-part representations. This may 
reflect their dependence on slightly different neural mechanisms (Blanke, 2012). 
Thus, bimodal visual-tactile neurons in parietal cortex may contribute to both 
illusions, but those subserving the RHI would have tactile receptive fields on the 
hand whereas those subserving the FBI may have tactile fields centred on the 
trunk. These neural populations differ in their response properties (Sakata, 
Taira, Murata & Milne, 1995; Serino et al., 2013), and may well differ in their 
development. This is because congruent visual tactile input is extremely common 
for the hand but less so for the trunk. Therefore it is very likely that trunk-
centred fields receive less input during childhood, causing the later development 
of responses to the FBI. Later development of responses to our ‘third-person-
perspective full-body illusion’ may also result because this requires some 
conception of one’s own body as an object situated in external space, whereas 
the first-person-perspective rubber hand illusion merely requires the 
representation of a hand in PPS. Thus, for young children who can demonstrate 
marked difficulty with perspective taking (Piaget & Inhelder, 1967), the full body 
illusion may be a much more demanding task for which adult-like responses take 
some time to develop. In order to test this, it would be useful to develop first-
person versions (e.g. van der Hoort et al., 2011) of the FBI in young children. The 
necessary developmental foundations for establishing self-identification with a 
virtual body should be explored in future work. 
 
Touch referral 
The phenomenon of mislocalizing (or mis-referring) touch to a virtual 
body is present in adults (e.g., Lenggenhager et al., 2007; 2009; Pomés & Slater, 
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2013). It can be measured by questionnaires, and is further evident in implicit 
measures, i.e., changes in crossmodal congruency effects (Aspell et al., 2009) and 
somatosensory evoked potentials (Aspell et al., 2012) during the illusion. The 
present study assessed the development of touch referral, and we found that the 
magnitude of difference between baseline-corrected questionnaire responses in 
the synchronous condition and the asynchronous condition increased strikingly 
with age. At 6-7 years, there were no significant differences between responses 
to synchronous and asynchronous stroking. In contrast, for 10- to 11-year-olds 
and adults, synchronous cues elicited significantly stronger feelings of touch 
referral than asynchronous cues. Further, at these ages, only synchronous 
stroking elicited ratings above neutral. Thus, we show that from 6-11 years there 
is increased referral of touch to a virtual body. 
It is interesting to note that the 6-7 years group may have experienced 
touch referral illusion in both conditions, since asynchronous ratings are rather 
high in this youngest group, later declining with age. As such referral of touch in 
this group may have been driven by viewing a body only (irrespective of visual-
tactile synchrony or asynchrony). To determine separately the effects of viewing 
a body and experiencing visual-tactile synchrony, an interesting follow-up would 
be the introduction of a no-stroking condition. Indeed some authors suggest that 
under certain conditions an FBI can occur simply by seeing the body, 
irrespective of touch (Maselli & Slater, 2013). It has also been shown that 
referral of touch can be elicited (measured by changes in the crossmodal 
congruency effect) simply by showing participants their own body, from the 
back, via an HMD (Aspell et al. 2009). Nevertheless, the widening gap between 
stroking conditions across ages suggests that younger children have a rather less 
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specific interpretation of body cues than older children. With age comes an 
increased ability to use multisensory visuo-tactile synchrony as a marker of body 
ownership, and to use asynchronous visuo-tactile stimulation as a cue indicating 
that one is not viewing one’s own body. 
The development of touch referral to the virtual body has interesting 
parallels to what we know of touch localization on hands across the same 
developmental period. In studies of the Rubber Hand Illusion, there is a widening 
gap between responses in the synchronous and asynchronous conditions from 4-
11 years (Cowie et al., 2013; Cowie et al., submitted). This accords with the 
present findings and may suggest that the integration of tactile information into 
body-defined reference frames improves across this period. Developmental 
changes in the role of vision for touch localization are also seen in other studies 
(Pagel, Heed & Röder, 2009; Begum Ali, Cowie & Bremner, 2014; Begum Ali, 
Spence & Bremner, 2015; Bremner, Mareschal, Lloyd-Fox & Spence, 2008).  
However, touch referral is experienced at 4 years in the RHI but only at 
10 years in the FBI. Again this may to some degree reflect developing 
multisensory mechanisms of body representation. A further consideration is 
that, in the RHI (Lloyd, 2007), drift is only induced when the body is within 
peripersonal space (PPS). If whole-body PPS is body-scaled (as for manual PPS 
space; Gabbard, Cordova & Ammar, 2007), then in absolute terms children’s 
whole-body PPS will not extend as far as adults’. The size of PPS varies widely 
between adult participants but has been measured to be in the region of ~60-
80cm from the body in (static) adults (Longo & Lourenco, 2007; Ferri et al., 
2015). In walking adults, the PPS extends to ~165 cm from the body (Noel et al., 
2014)), although interestingly, it has recently been shown that the FBI enlarges 
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the PPS in front-space by ~15-30cm (Noel et al., 2015). In our task, when self-
location is measured, participants first walk 150 cm backwards and typically end 
up <25 cm forwards of their start position (e.g., Lenggenhager et al., 2007; Aspell 
et al., 2009). While this would be inside the ‘PPS boundary’ for adults, it may fall 
outside it for children. This could make touch localization difficult and it may 
also explain why we did not find any drift in self-location in children. The 
interesting question of how whole-body peripersonal space develops in 
childhood should be investigated in future work. 
Interestingly, we find earlier development of self-identification than touch 
referral: at 6-7 years, self-identification, but not touch referral, was significantly 
moderated by synchrony. This supports the growing understanding that 
different aspects of bodily illusions are dissociable (Longo et al., 2008; Rohde & 
Ernst, 2011; Maselli & Slater, 2014; Serino et al., 2013). In particular, it is clear 
that the experience of ownership involves a wide network of brain areas 
processing not only visuo-tactile synchronies but also, for example, visuo-
proprioceptive synchronies and interoceptive sensations. The difference in 
developmental trajectories we find here suggests that future work should 
explore further the links between touch referral and ownership (self-
identification) in the full body illusion. 
 
Self-location 
Self-location was measured as drift in perceived self-location following visuo-
tactile stimulation. In adults, following synchronous stroking self-location was 
perceived to be forwards of the real body position, towards the virtual body. In 
contrast, we found no difference in drift measures between synchronous and 
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asynchronous stroking in children. This suggests that synchronous visuo-tactile 
stimulation of one’s own and a virtual body cannot induce a drift in self-location 
towards the virtual body until adulthood, and contrasts with the RHI, in which 
there is reliable drift for children from 4 years old (Cowie et al., 2013).  
As for the questionnaire responses we gathered, developing neural 
systems, spatial factors, or a smaller peripersonal space might explain the lack of 
drift towards the virtual body in children. The developmental dissociation we 
find between self-location and other aspects of the illusion is entirely consistent 
with the adult data discussed above which shows that changes in body 
ownership can occur in the absence of changes in self-location (e.g., Maselli & 
Slater, 2014; Serino et al., 2013; Petkova et al., 2011). It further supports the 
developmental finding from the rubber hand illusion that ownership and drift 
are dissociable in body illusions (Cowie et al., 2013). In line with that data, we 
find here a later development of self-location than self-identification, suggesting 
that spatial representation of the self is a more difficult skill to develop than a 
sense of body-part ownership or self-identification. Although this is highly 
speculative at this stage, our data would be consistent with a later development 
of the temporoparietal junction, which is specifically associated with self-
location, than the premotor cortex, which is more associated with 
ownership/identification (Serino et al., 2013).  
It is also possible that aspects of our design affected the drift variable. 
Walking back to the target requires more steps for younger children because of 
their shorter stride lengths, and these added steps might introduce more noise, 
masking differences between synchronous and asynchronous conditions. In 
support of this, baseline variable error was higher in our youngest groups. The 
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drift task also taxes working memory, which has limited capacity in young 
children (Gathercole, Pickering, Ambridge & Wearing, 2004) - in order for drift 
to occur, the participant must remember both the perceived location of their 
own body during visuo-tactile stimulation, and how far backwards they moved 
during the displacement phase. These demands are not present in the single, 
arm-length scaled reaching response used in the RHI. The slightly zoomed 
images presented to young children may have made the virtual body feel closer 
to them than for older children, resulting in less drift at those ages. 
In summary, the lack of significant drift in the FBI suggests a relative 
immaturity of full-body representation in children, in terms of the ability to 
represent the body as an object in external space and the ability to derive a sense 
of body ownership from visuo-tactile correlations. It raises the interesting 
question of how PPS develops in childhood, and underlines the motor and 
memory demands that may constrain children engaging in virtual experiences. 
 
Practical implications  
The results of the present study strongly suggest that virtual “out-of-body 
experiences” can be experimentally elicited in the same way for children as for 
adults. With a very simple setup (no stereoscopic display, stimulation delivered 
for only 2 minutes), we were able to induce of ownership for and touch referral 
towards a virtual body. These results suggest the promise of using virtual 
technologies with children. Through commercially available systems such as the 
Oculus Rift, virtual reality is becoming increasingly available both for computer 
games and education. Recent work with adults has shown in particular that 
virtual environments can be useful tools for understanding social interactions, 
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for example in reducing implicit racial bias (Peck, Seinfeld, Aglioti & Slater, 2013) 
or simulating dangerous situations (Slater et al., 2013). Yet while we know that 
adults can be convincingly embodied in (and have self-identification for) a child’s 
body (Banakou, Groten & Slater, 2013), we still need to understand the limits of  
viable virtual bodies for children. This will include understanding the roles of 
visual-proprioceptive congruency (Sanchez-Vives, Spanlang, Frisoli, Bergamasco 
& Slater, 2010) and interoceptive signals (Aspell et al., 2013) in body ownership; 
as well as the importance of first-person perspective. Further, it will be 
necessary to measure the extent to which the form of the body matters for 
children, as it does for adults (Lenggenhager et al., 2007; Salomon, van Elk, 
Aspell & Blanke, 2012; Steptoe, Steed & Slater, 2013). However, the present data 
provide a good starting point from which to begin this process of tailoring virtual 
bodies for use with children. 
 
Summary 
Using the Full Body Illusion, we found synchrony-dependent changes in self-
identification, touch referral, as well as an anterior drift in perceived self-
location for adults. These findings are all in keeping with previous studies. For 
the first time we showed that, for children, the effects of the FBI on self-
identification are present from 6-7 years. However, effects on both self-
identification and touch referral became stronger with age. These findings 
suggest that links between multisensory integration and bodily self-
consciousness develop significantly across childhood. 
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Table 1. Self-identification Questionnaire. 
 
1 When I was stroking with the magic wand, did it sometimes seem as if you 
could feel the touch of the stick on the body you saw over there? 
2 When I was stroking with the magic wand, did you sometimes feel like the 
body you saw over there was your body? 
3 When I was stroking with the magic wand, did it feel like your nose was 
growing? 
4 Did you notice any difference between the first and second times I did the 
stroking? 
 
 
 
Table 2. Baseline drift responses. Constant error (average distance between 
baseline estimates and target: positive errors are forwards). Variable error 
(unsigned difference between the two baseline estimates). Means (standard 
errors) shown. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. T-tests comparing baseline-corrected drift responses to zero. Using 
one-sample t-tests, with p values corrected for 8 multiple comparisons. 
 
  
Age group Constant error (m) Variable error (m) 
6-7 y -.012 (0.06) 0.310 (0.05) 
8-9 y -.087 (0.06) 0.271 (0.05) 
10-11 y -.192 (0.05) 0.203 (0.04) 
Adult 0.023 (0.03) 0.145 (0.02) 
Age group Condition t df Sig Effect size 
(Cohen’s d) 
6-7 y S -2.1 27 1.0 -0.4 
 A -1.3 27 1.0 -0.2 
8-9 y S 1.0 20 1.0 0.2 
 A 0.01 20 1.0 0.0 
10-11 y S -0.8 18 1.0 -0.2 
 A 1.7 18 1.0 0.4 
Adult S 5.4 30 <.001* 1.0 
 
 A 0.1 30 1.0 
 
0.0 
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Figure 2. Group medians (black lines) and interquartile ranges. Whiskers represent 1.5 x IQR. 
Outliers (1.5-3 x IQR) shown by unfilled circles; extreme values (>3 x IQR) shown by asterisks. 
Shown for a Q3 (control question) raw scores. b Q1 (touch referral) scores. c Q2 (self-
identification) scores. d Q4 (awareness) scores. 
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Fig  3. Group means ±SEM of baseline-corrected drift following synchronous and asynchronous 
stroking, and within-subjects differences between drift in these conditions. 
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